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ABSTRACT
Despite support from and for right-wing elements and a deep-seeded national history of
anti-Semitism, the policies of the Russian government under Vladimir Putin have been markedly
devoid of anti-Semitism. Appeals to nationalist, imperialist, and Eurasianist ideologies,
pragmatic politics, and foreign policy concerns fail to explain these policies adequately. The
biography of Putin himself, which includes influential, positive relationships with Jews, provides
a better explanation. The personalized influence of the president on Jewish policy suggests a
personalized, hyper-centralized regime generally.
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Introduction
The Vladimir Putin government and regime* could be reasonably expected to be
officially and virulently anti-Semitic. Both the major regimes that preceded it, the Soviet Union
and the Romanov dynasty, were officially anti-Semitic and actively persecuted Jews inside their
territory, often singling them about above other minorities for special mistreatment. The Russian
population is also widely considered anti-Semitic, thanks in part to the anti-Semitic conspiracy
theories and libels sometimes peddled by the Russian Orthodox Church. The KGB (along with
its successor, the FSB), in which Putin achieved both his first real job and his rise to power,
were/are notoriously anti-Semitic. Recent scholarship has uncovered the influence and
prevalence of right-wing ideologies in Russia, including among some elements of the political
elite, as well as Russian support for far-right politics in the West, especially in Europe. Each of
these features independently would suggest an anti-Semitic government.
In reality, however, the Putin government is not officially anti-Semitic, and the unofficial
anti-Semitism of some of its officials appears to be limited, and a strictly personal, as opposed to
part of government policy. This paper will examine the historical precedent of official state antiSemitism in Russia, contrast this with the Putin government’s policies, and outline possible
explanations for those policies using existing research. Several theories are presented and
evaluated, including the influence of right-wing ideologies, the Kremlin’s propagandistic use of
political ideas, the sociological nature of contemporary Russian popular anti-Semitism, and
finally, the influence of Putin himself. While no explanation is perfect, the influence of the

*

For the purposes of this paper, the governments of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev are
inseparable from the regime centered around Vladimir Putin that has undoubtedly emerged in
Russia. See Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia. The terms “government” and “regime” are used
interchangeably.
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personality of the president on Russian Jewish policy appears decisive. This is likely the case for
other policy domains as well.

Historical Precedent
Based on the precedent established by nearly all the preceding leaders of Russia, there
would be very little surprising or unusual if Putin were to support anti-Semitic ideas inside and
outside Russia. His pre-Soviet predecessors, the Romanov tsars, embraced stridently anti-Semitic
policies, including the Pale of Settlement, state-sanctioned or state-enabled pogroms, and
exclusion of Jews from many kinds of business and government.1 The “temporary” May Laws of
1882, which lasted for more than 30 years, were the beginning in a string of legislation designed
to exclude Jews from the social and economic life of the Russian Empire. Jewish settlement was
frozen to pre-existing towns and agricultural colonies; Jews were forbidden to take out leases or
mortgages or hold powers of attorney; and they were mandated to close their businesses on
Christian holidays, including Sundays.2 “In the following years, Russian officials capped the
number of Jewish doctors in the army, limited movement within the Pale, placed strict quotas on
Jewish placement in universities, and restricted the activities of Jewish lawyers, among
numerous other discriminatory actions.”3 Perhaps most famously, the Russian secret police or
Okhrana (Охрана) is believed to have originally fabricated The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.4
Many of these policies were adopted under Alexander III, who sought to revise some of
his father’s reforms and reinstate the first governing ideology of Russia, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy,

1

Aaron Levine, "Russian Jews and the 1917 Revolution," Primary Source 4, no. 2.
Herman Rosenthal, "May Laws," Jewish Encyclopedia, last modified 2011, accessed
November 29, 2017.
3
Levine, "Russian Jews.”
4
Anti-Defamation League, "A Hoax of Hate: The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,"
ADL.org, last modified 2017, accessed November 29, 2017.
2
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and Nationality” (“Православие – Самодержавие – Народность”). The prioritization of
Russian ethnic and Orthodox religious supremacy within the empire naturally led to the
persecution of minorities, including the Jews. Official anti-Semitism has older and deeper roots
in Russia than any holdover of Soviet ideology, and would not be an incongruous addition to a
post-Soviet governing ideology, especially one that defaulted at least in part to the philosophical
status quo ante.
Anti-Semitism in Russia was so strong, in fact, that even the cataclysm of the Russian
Revolution could only temporarily suppress their expression. Under Lenin, anti-Semitism is
Russia was softened, though not eradicated entirely. The key ideological element of antiSemitism, “The belief or behavior hostile toward Jews just because they are Jewish,” was
replaced by Marxist attitudes opposed to religion and national identity more broadly.5 Many
secular Jews rose to great prominence in Lenin’s party, including Lev Kamenev, Grigory
Zinoviev, and Leon Trotsky. Even though Bolshevik policies toward Jews may easily be
interpreted as anti-Semitic in effect, aimed at annihilating any particular religious or national
identity or tradition among Jews, it was not specifically anti-Semitic in intent: “Lenin measured
people – and ethnicities, including the Jews – with the yardstick of party and state…”6 As was
made clear by Stalin’s “Marxism and the National Question,” written during Lenin’s dominance
of the party, each nationality was to be allowed to choose its own cultural policies while all
political policies would be promulgated by the Communist Party-controlled government.7 The

5

Anti-Defamation League, "Anti-Semitism," ADL.org, last modified 2017, accessed November
29, 2017.
6
Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Lenin's Jewish Question (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2010).
7
Josef Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question," trans. Carl Kavanagh, Marxists Internet
Archive, accessed April 24, 2017.
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anti-Semitism of the Lenin era was unique in that it was an unremarkable part of a larger antireligious, anti-national, universalist revolution.
Stalin at first pursued similar policies, and in fact promulgated much harsher policies
toward other ethnic and religious minorities in the Soviet Union than toward Jews. The list of
deported nations includes Balkars, Caucasus Greeks, Chechens, Crimean Greeks, Crimean
Tatars, Estonians, Far East Koreans, Ingrians, Ingush, Kalmyks, Karachays, Karapapaks,
Karelian Finns, Latvians, Lithuanians, Maskhetian Turks, Poles, Romanians, and Volga
Germans. By contrast, despite the creation of a Jewish Autonomous Oblast on the Mongolian
border, Jews were never forcible deported there (though evidence exists that there was just such
a plan at the time of Stalin’s death, which was never carried out).
By the middle of Stalin’s reign, however, official anti-Semitism had creeped back into
the Soviet government:
Anti-Semitism was introduced in the ideology of the Soviet Union in the late 1930s. The
restrictions placed on Jews – a sort of ‘anti-affirmative action policy’ – soon became
universal. Following a short respite in the aftermath of the revolution in the 1920s, Russia
returned to the traditional anti-Semitic policy of the tsars (particularly the policy of the
last two, Alexander the Third and Nicholas the Second).8
Notably, the particular ostracizing of Jews returned, along with the requisite ideological tenets,
singling out Jews as a particular threat per se worthy of more attention and more opposition than
other nationalities and religions.
The open propaganda against Jews jarred with Lenin’s heritage and internationalism. For
this reason, the Soviet authorities replaced the term Jews with ‘Zionists’. Since Zionism
was a ‘legitimate’ enemy of socialism, it became possible to carry out an anti-Semitic
campaign under the guise of the fight against it. The hatred of Jews was so high that the
Soviet propaganda tended to describe Zionism as a greater evil than the United States,

8

Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible Politician. Does He Imitate Stalin?," Communist
and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008): 206.
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suggesting that American imperialism was merely a tool used by the Jews to conquer the
world.
The anti-Zionist campaigns, which started almost immediately after the Bolshevik victory
and intensified in the mid 1920s, were carried out until the final days of the USSR. The
ideologues of perestroika, who denounced all the sacred cows of the Soviet ideology,
such as the October revolution, Marxism, Lenin and socialism, left the Soviet attitudes
toward Zionism intact. By the end of perestroika, in 1990, Soviet Encyclopedic
Dictionary defined Zionism exactly as was done in the late 1930s: “The typical features
of Zionism as an advanced detachment of imperialism are militant chauvinism, racism,
anti-Communism, anti-Sovietism”. As a matter of fact, the article in the 1990 edition,
published on the eve of Perestroika, was literally a copy of the article ‘Zionism’ in the
1984 edition. The book Zionism at the Service of Anti-Communism by Bolshakov, who
worked in the Central Committee, was a typical publication of this sort.…
The Soviet state anti-Semitism was particularly heinous, because it was rather an
exception to a sort of tolerance cultivated in the Soviet Union toward other minorities.
Only Germans, given the heritage of the war, shared to some degree the position of the
Jews as the pariahs in the Soviet Empire.9
The last days of the Stalin Era also saw the Doctors Plot, a public display of
conspiratorial anti-Semitism in which several physicians, most of them Jews, were convicted in
show trials of conspiring to assassinate Stalin on behalf of British and American intelligence
organizations in conjunction with a secretive international Jewish organization. The plot was
symptomatic of Stalin’s fears that Jews were a potential “fifth column” within the Soviet Union,
a variation of the ancient “dual-loyalty” libel used against Jews as far back as the Roman
Empire. Along with the renaissance of ideological anti-Semitism came the return of anti-Semitic
policies, effectively barring Jews from the upper levels of government in the Soviet Union and
mandating anti-Jewish quotas in education.

9

Ibid., 208.
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Such policies would continue through the next four decades of Soviet history. Official
anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union became so engrained and institutionalized, in fact, that it
altered or colored the meaning of the term in anti-Semitism Russian (антисемитизм):
Under the Soviet regime, anti-Semitism was a state-sponsored policy, reflected in
campaigns in the government-controlled press, arrests of Jewish activists and Hebrew
teachers, mass refusal of the right to emigrate and discriminatory quotas on admission to
higher education and certain prestigious occupations.
The Russian word antisemitizm is therefore understood by many Russian Jews to mean
solely the state-sponsored anti-Semitism of the past. When these same people describe
anti-Semitic acts committed by non-state actors, they more often than not precede it with
the word bytovoy ('day to day' or' street-level').10
Both the Imperial and Soviet history of Russia would tend to support continued antiSemitism sponsored, endorsed, and enforced by the Russian government, both because of the
preexistent ideological templates available to the Kremlin and because of sheer inertia.
Surprisingly, official anti-Semitism in Russia is arguable at a multi-century low.
Putin’s relations toward both individual Jews and the Jewish people in Russia has been
remarkably warm. Individuals of Jewish background have been among Putin’s closest advisors
and allies during his years in power, including Roman Abramovich (Chairman of the Federation
of the Jewish Communities of Russia and one of the most visible oligarchs), Arkady and Boris
Rotenberg, Oleg Deripaska, Viktor Vekselberg, and Mikhail Fridman.11 (Notable opponents,
victims, and scapegoats of the Putin regime have also been Jewish, including Boris Berezovsky,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Hungarian-born American George Soros.)
In fact, state anti-Semitism (as opposed to popular anti-Semitism) has almost completely
disappeared from the Russian political scene. Jews or so called half Jews hold a large
number of high positions in the state apparatus, including the government and leading
10

Nickolai Butkevich, "The New Face of State-Sponsored Anti-Semitism in Russia," East
European Jewish Affairs 32, no. 1 (June 2006): 138.
11
Luke Harding, "The Richer They Come...," The Guardian, last modified July 2, 2007,
accessed November 29, 2017.
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state corporations. The appointment of Mikhail Fradkov as prime minister in 2004 was
only one of many of Putin’s appointments that totally ignored the ethnic background of
the candidate. No less indicative was the appointment in 2007 of two managers with
Jewish backgrounds, Leonid Melamed and Semen Vainshtok, as the heads of two big
state corporations, both with multi-billion dollar budgets. One of the corporations dealt
with nanotechnology, while the other was building the facilities for the Olympic Games
in 2014 in Sochi.12
In particularly stark contrast to the anti-Semitic policies of the Soviet Union, euphemized as
“anti-Zionist,” the Russian government under Putin has maintained remarkably close and
cooperative relations with Israel. “During Putin’s presidency, Israel has come to play an
increasingly significant role in Russia’s Middle East policy. Putin has done more than any other
Russian leader to improve economic and strategic ties with Israel.”13 As Ilya Bourtman points
out, the areas of cooperation between the Putin government and successive Israeli governments
have mostly centered on counterterrorism and energy infrastructure and trade.14 His analysis
perhaps understates the significance of this cooperation: Beyond mere “pragmatism, cynicism,
and economic calculations,” energy exports and security – particularly against terrorists – are the
cornerstones of Putin’s legitimacy, such as it is. More than any other policies, energy and
security determine the fate and true intention of the Putin regime, and their close cooperation
with Israel on these matters suggests a sincere respect and affinity that, while not unlimited,
would be scandalous for any previous Russian ruler. “In short, for centuries of Russian history,
through different political regimes and social conditions, the ‘standing decision’ has been that
Jews are to blame for Russia’s problems, and this presumption has resulted in countless incidents

12

Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 213.
Ilya Bourtman, "Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy," Middle East Review of
International Affairs 10, no. 2 (June 2006): 2.
14
Ibid., 2-4.
13
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of discrimination, victimization and violence.”15 Putin’s cooperation with Israel suggests that
decision has been nullified.
This is reflected in his domestic affairs as well.
His overtures to Jews within Russia have been no less unprecedented:
During his stay in the Kremlin, Putin met with rabbis several times. In his last meeting
with Russia’s chief rabbi in June 2007, he promised to donate one month’s salary for the
construction of a Jewish museum of tolerance. Putin meets regularly with representatives
from Russian Jewish Communities and various Western Jewish organizations. In October
2007, he met with a representative of the European Jewish Congress, attended many
Jewish religious celebrations (for instance, Hanukkah in 2001) and regularly sent
congratulations to the Russian Jews in connection with Rosh Ha-Shanah, the Jewish New
Year and Hanukkah. Speaking in Krakow on January 27, 2005, in connection with the
60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, Putin urged other nations to consider the
lessons learned from the Holocaust and warned against anti-Semitism, racism and
xenophobia worldwide. What is more, he also noted the existence of anti-Semitism in
Russia, a statement that none of the Soviet leaders after Lenin dared to make...16
While the statements of the president are not always signs of durable and explicit policies
positions of the Russian government, it appears that Putin’s friendliness toward Jews is either
being encouraged among other government officials or is voluntarily imitated by them,
suggesting a more permanent and official status of pro-Semitic† attitudes within the government.
Putin continues to make positive gestures towards Russia’s Jewish community by
attending major Jewish events, praising the role of Jews in Russia’s history and
contemporary life, and strongly condemning antisemitism. In many regions, it is no
longer uncommon to see a mayor or governor visit a synagogue or congratulate the
community on a holiday. These official gestures have helped to create a more confident
climate for Jews in Russia, spurring a continued renaissance of Jewish life in Russia, as
evidenced by the growing number of synagogues being returned to the community after
decades of government ownership, the increasing media coverage of Jewish communal
activities and statements by Jewish leaders about domestic and international events, and a

15

James L. Gibson and Morjé Howard, "Russian Anti-Semitism and the Scapegoating of
Jews," British Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 (April 2007): 198.
16
Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 211-212.
† The term “pro-Semitic” is used advisedly, and merely intends to denote the differences between
the Putin government and its predecessors. It is only a relative distinction, and is not meant to
provide an absolute positive or negative evaluation of the government’s Jewish policies.
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rising willingness of Jewish leaders in some parts of the country to stand up publicly for
their rights.17
The Putin government is innovating policies in relation to Jews that it seems unwilling or
unable to do in relation to the legacy of Stalin. In one sense, that might be expected: The legacy
of Stalin has, in some ways, been the central question of Russian politics since Khrushchev’s
speech to the XX Party Congress.18 However, the history of destalinization is rich in postStalinist Russia, providing ample precedent for an anti-Stalinist line. Putin’s statements about
Stalin have been of a decidedly mixed and often self-contradictory note, simultaneously
rehabilitating the legacy of the former dictator and raising monuments to the victims of his
purges and repressions.19 The precedent for pro-Semitism is much thinner. The fact that the
messaging and policy from the Kremlin is more stable and consistent in relation to Jews than it is
to Stalin suggests that choosing a policy on Jews is easier for the Kremlin than choosing a policy
on Stalin.
However cynical, the Russian government’s use of accusations of anti-Semitism to
slander it’s foes also suggests a consistent pro-Semitic self-perception. The annexation of Crimea
and proxy war in Donbas following the Euromaidan of 2014 have provided several good
examples. “The revolutionary change of power in Kiev prompted the Kremlin to view new
Ukrainian values as incompatible with those of Russia and Eurasia. In his press conference, Putin

17

Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), Antisemitism, Xenophobia
and Religious Persecution in Russia’s Regions, 2001 (Moscow: UCSJ, 2002), 1-2.
18
Василий Жарков и Андрей Колесников, «Восставший из ада,» Новое время/New Times,
December 21, 2009.
19
Anna Aruntunyan, "As Confederate Statues Fall in U.S., Russians Are Erecting Statues for
Dictator Stalin," USA Today, last modified August 16, 2017, accessed November 29, 2017.
Neil McFarquhar, "Critics Scoff as Kremlin Honors the Repressed," The New York Times (New
York), October 31, 2017.
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referred to the Ukrainian events as the ‘rampage of Nazi, nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces.’”20
Referring to the Euromaidan protests, he claimed that “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes
and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.”21
Certainly, the Kremlin has also accused others of its own bad behavior, such as
interfering in the domestic politics of other countries. Ordinarily, accusations against other
countries by the Putin government bear little ontological weight. Indeed, Kremlin endorsement is
often a contrary indicator to verisimilitude. However, given the context of the steady
continuation of the Kremlin’s Jewish policies under Putin, these statements might be viewed in
another light – not as arch-cynical accusations, but as a way of defining whomever is conceived
to be Russia’s enemy as the opposite of Russian. In the Ukrainian case, defining a pro-Western
enemy as pro-gay and anti-Semitic (at least relative to Russia) may contain a kernel of truth.22
In addition to historical precedent, Putin’s Jewish policies should also be evaluated in
terms of their political benefits and costs. If, upon assuming the presidency in 1999 (and in his
own right in 2000), Putin had decided to adopt more historically congruous, anti-Semitic policies
and rhetoric, the costs would likely have been quite low. Clearly, at least in terms of domestic
politics, anti-Semitism did not appear to hurt the political prospects or power of any of Putin’s
predecessors.

20

Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine
Policy," Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 4 (February 4, 2015): 294.
21
Vladimir Putin, "Address by President of the Russian Federation," President of Russia, last
modified March 18, 2015, accessed November 29, 2017.
22
Tom Balmforth, "As Ukraine Says 'Farewell Unwashed Russia,' Putin Says Take Care in 'Gay'
Europe," RFERL, last modified June 15, 2017, accessed November 29, 2017.
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The only possible exception was Yeltsin, who, likely because of his dedication to
rapprochement with the West and strengthening his democratic bona fides, failed to adopt the
pro-Semitic policies of Putin. Rather,
As a builder of democracy and a proclaimed ally of the West, Boris Yeltsin eliminated,
considering his cadre policy, even the slightest suspicion that, as a former party regional
secretary, he was an anti-Semite. He involved many Jews in his government and
administration, but avoided any public demonstration of his break with the old party line,
preferring to show, as the known Moscow journalist Radzikhovsky observed, that “he is
completely indifferent to any national issue.”23
Nonetheless, Yeltsin’s example demonstrates – as if proof was needed – that pro-Semitism was
not a silver bullet in Russian politics, propelling its first adherent to lifelong power.
Conversely, the all-but-unimpeachable conclusion that Putin holds an unbreakable grip
on supreme power in Russia suggests that he could adopt supremely unpopular or otherwise
risky positions without encountering a serious threat to his dominance.
The list of troubling features of Russian politics in the 2010s included unfair and
fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent political parties with a
dominant “party of power” (which was also weak and impotent), heavily censored (and
often self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and subnational
levels, politically subordinated and shamelessly biased courts, arbitrary use of state
economic powers, and widespread corruption. These assessments resonate with numerous
critical evaluations of Russia’s politics and governance by domestic and international
agencies and experts: despite the huge variety of their analytical frameworks and the use
of diverse methodologies, techniques, and approaches, almost everybody agrees that the
political regime in present-day Russia is genuinely nondemocratic (although for various
reasons some observers, until very recently, hesitated to label it “authoritarian”).24
There are, of course, natural limits to Putin’s power, and his government has granted concessions
to opposition forces when it felt it was required. Protests against pension reform in 2005, for
instance, prompted the government to double the planned increase in pension payments and

23

Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 210.
Vladimir Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Change (Pittsburgh,
PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 2.
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reintroduce free public transportation.25 After the 2011-2012 Bolotnaya protests in opposition to
the suspect 2011 Duma elections and the dubious 2012 reelection of Putin, the Duma amended
the constitution to restore local election of regional governors as a democratic compromise.26 But
neither of these concessions seriously threatened his control. Indeed, many governors have been
effectively fired in 2017 as the Kremlin has announced its acceptance of resignations they never
sent. Others have resigned at the behest of the Kremlin.27 In other words, the pro-Semitic policies
of Putin’s Kremlin cannot be described as political necessities. Putin can, in the long run, adopt
any policies he wants – even to the extent that he can de facto change the constitution and rule
from the prime minister’s office:
Putin, as the dominant actor of Russian politics, was able to consolidate his monopolist
control over the Russian elite, and had relatively little trouble passing the office into the
hands of a puppetlike loyal successor, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2008, while maintaining
control over key levers of power as the prime minister.28
Moreover, anti-Semitism could have been a powerful political weapon for the Kremlin.
The issue might have been used as a way to drive a wedge through the opposition, much like the
2013 law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of
Traditional Family Values” (“в целях защиты детей от информации, пропагандирующей
отрицание традиционных семейных ценностей”) and other measures after the Bolotnaya
protests:
First, the Kremlin sensationalised the minor, allegedly sacrilegious performance of the
Russian punk band Pussy Riot in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour to bring
division into the opposition movement on religious grounds. Second, Russia adopted the
so-called Dima Yakovlev Law that banned US citizens from adopting Russian orphan
25

Claire Bigg, "Protests across Russia Force Putin to Double Increase in Pension Payments," The
Guardian, January 18, 2005, accessed November 29, 2017.
26
Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia, 120.
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "Karelia Governor Is Fifth to Resign in Russia in Recent
Days," FRERL, last modified February 15, 2017, accessed November 29, 2017.
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Gel'man, Authoritarian Russia, 41.
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children in order to divide the opposition on the grounds of Russian nationalism
intrinsically characterised by anti-Americanism. Third, it adopted the anti-LGBT
propaganda law officially to protect children from ‘information advocating for a denial of
traditional family values’, but essentially to splinter the opposition movement exploiting
the divisive LGBT issue.29
The same tactic could have been used during the 2017 protests, which spread to hundreds
of cities across Russia, in contrast to the Bolotnaya protests, which were primarily localized to
Moscow.30 The geographic distribution of the 2017 protests likely points to a broader cultural
appeal, as does their focus. Rather than focusing on abstractions like electoral legitimacy or the
rule of law, which resonated in 2011-2012 primarily with the educated, urban class, the 2017
protests were led by anti-corruption politician Aleksei Navalny primarily in response to an
exposé he published on YouTube, detailing the corruption of Dmitri Medvedev.31 Navalny, who
has indicated sympathy with nationalists in the past, might have been hard-pressed to disavow an
anti-Semitic move by the Kremlin, while the core of his supporters – the same educated, urban
veterans of the Bolotnaya – would be scandalized. The fact that the Kremlin used such sensitive
subjects as Orthodoxy, adoption of orphans, and homosexuality in a politically utilitarian way,
but avoided using anti-Semitism, reveals exactly how committed the regime is to its Jewish
policies.
Lately, much attention in the academic literature and beyond has focused on the Putin
regime’s relationship with far-right nationalist forces, both within Russia and in the West. The
influence of thinkers and theorists such as Aleksandr Dugin, Lev Gumilev, Ivan Ilyin, and
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Nikolai Danilevski has been brought to light and debated. (There are other suspected intellectual
forbearers of the current Kremlin as well; the four listed here will be discussed further in this
paper.) Generally, one would expect to find anti-Semitism follows wherever nationalism goes. In
Russia, no less, where the stage seems perfectly set for revanchist nationalism, it is particularly
strange to find pro-Semitism mixed with Russian nationalism and/or Eurasianism.
Although, as detailed above, many of Putin’s policies are unusually friendly towards
Jews, it is necessary to point out that Putin’s Kremlin has also adopted policies and postures that
can be interpreted as anti-Semitic themselves, give aid and comfort to anti-Semites, or both.
Unlike Western leaders, he did not openly stand up against the two greatest anti-Semites
of our timed the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and the Iranian President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad. In October 2003, Putin attended the meeting of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, during which Mahathir Mohamad talked about the Jews who
ruled the world. As Putin’s semiofficial biographer Kolesnikov wrote in his book Putin
Saw Me, the Russian President said nothing about this rude anti-Semitic tirade, even
though he had the opportunity to do so, because he addressed the conference following
the Malaysian leader. While chatting with the Russian journalists who attended the
conference, Putin did mention that some speeches at the conference were ‘extremist’.
What is more, Putin never made critical comments about the appeal of the current [2008]
president of Iran to obliterate Israel.32
He has also hosted meetings with groups such as Hamas, which are openly anti-Semitic in ways
most similar to Ahmadinejad. On a lesser count, Putin’s government has been firm in opposition
to returning the library of the Lubavicher Rebbe Menachem Schneerson.33 The books, seized by
the Nazis during World War II, were transported to Moscow after the war, while their original
owners, the Lubavich sect of Hassidic Jews, moved their community to New York. Litigation
about the matter is ongoing, and the fact that the Lubavichers chose to move to the United States
and their use of the American legal system to try to reclaim their former property may be an
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inspiration to the Russian government’s opposition.34 Nonetheless, these policies, consequential
as they may be, are deviations from the pro-Semitic norm of the 21st-century Kremlin.
There are several explanations that may account for why Putin’s government has pursued
such consistent pro-Semitic policies, including the nationalist ideological tenets of his regime
(such as they may be), the Putin government’s pragmatic use of political ideas is propaganda,
foreign policy considerations, and Putin’s personal biography.

The Ideology Hypothesis
The support that Putin’s government has given to far-right elements inside and outside
Russia would also suggest, prima facie, that the regime would support anti-Semitism. After all,
in the West, far-right ideas and groups are ubiquitously anti-Semitic (in addition to a host of
other bigotries). Upon first glance, it seems to follow naturally that far-right ideologues in Russia
would be anti-Semitic as well: They live in a country with a tradition of popular anti-Semitism at
least as long and deep as those of other European countries, and they endorse ideas commonly
associated with anti-Semitism, including ethnic or national supremacy.
Those who believe that the Putin regime is influenced by far-right ideas, whether because
Putin himself endorses them or because other senior members of the government do, have
several examples of particular and influential nationalist and/or Eurasianist theorists who did not
subscribe to anti-Semitism as evidence to support their claim. While it is possible that some in
the highest positions in the government, including Putin himself, subscribe to Eurasianist and
similar ideas, the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Eurasianist ideology is still too great to
adequately explain the Putin government’s Jewish policies.
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Aleksandr Dugin
The most prominent face of current Russian far-right thought is Aleksandr Dugin, an
autodidact political philosopher and conspiracy theorist with ties to some influential Kremlin
figures, including the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Army. “Russia’s salvation,
Dugin believed, lay in turning back the tide of democratic liberalism, re-establishing repressive
central control, and bringing to power a regime of patriots, beholden to an imperial concept of
Russia, a multinational, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, but distinctly Russian and distinctly
non-Western geopolitical space – ‘Eurasia’.”35 In short, he views the irrepressible tide of world
history as a conflict between “water powers” – states that grow up around coastlines, develop
naval and merchant cultures and economies, free markets, pluralism, and secularism – and land
powers, which grow up on the great Eurasian land mass, especially the enormous steppe running
from Eastern Europe to western China, independent of coasts, and develop strong land armies,
autocracy, omnipotent states, and conservative, spiritual cultures.
In his view, the fundamental conflict of the Cold War was one between Soviet land
power and the Euro-Atlantic (or, alternately, Anglo-Saxon, i.e. Anglo-American) sea power.
Consequently, the enmity between Washington and Moscow could not and did not end with the
fall of Communism because the central issue was not over what sort of political or economic
system would dominate the post-imperial world, but over whether water or land civilization
would dominate – an altogether larger and more timeless question. (It should go without saying
that this view runs counter to most scholarship of the Cold War.)
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Dugin’s conception of Russia is as a dominant cultural and political actor in a larger,
united civilization: Eurasia. Eurasia includes, coincidentally, all the former possessions of the
Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, including the Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Russian Far East, plus perhaps more. This
massive territory, currently comprised of dozens of countries, he identifies as the Eurasian
Heartland.
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This map of the world, indicating areas of relative geopolitical importance, was first
published by Halford MacKinder in “The Great Geopolitical Pivot of History” in 1904 and was
reproduced by Aleksandr Dugin in The Foundations of Geopolitics in 1997.36
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The geostrategic importance of the Eurasian Heartland is clearly depicted on the cover
of Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997). The subtitle below the map of Eurasia,
emblazoned with the “arrow of chaos,” reads, “The Geopolitical Future of Russia.”
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To the extent that Jews enter into Dugin’s thinking at all, they play only a very small role.
As a rule of thumb, this suggests he is not an anti-Semite.‡ Since Jews have lived for centuries in
countries and among civilizations belonging to both of Dugin’s categories, they do not belong
more on either side of Dugin’s ledger. They are neither inherent enemies nor inherent allies of
Russian Eurasia. In some ways, the epistemological certainty of Dugin’s geographical
determinism precludes him from sharing the KGB-style anti-Semitism seen in Putin’s regime.
According to Albats,
KGB people believe in the World Jewish Conspiracy… They do believe that the world is
run by Jews, that there is some world government, that there is some conspiratorial
money or body. There were several cases when these guys were approaching me and
saying, “We understand you have a great connections to the World Jewish Congress,”
and I was thinking, “Wait a second, you guys don't know what you’re talking about.”37
Conspiracy theories are such a common marker of anti-Semitism that they are almost part of the
very definition. The U.S. State Department’s webpage “Defining Anti-Semitism” includes:
“Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as
such or the power of Jews as a collective—especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world
Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal
institutions.”38 By contrast, Dugin’s premise that geography is the controlling force of history
precludes belief in secret global conspiracies. While not dispositive, this suggests that Dugin’s
influence is nationalistic and imperialistic, but not specifically anti-Semitic.
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The most easily accessible statements of Dugin regarding Jews are from a YouTube
interview recorded March 6, 2016.39 In that interview, Dugin differentiates in two ways between
the State of Israel and Jews. First, there is a “natural sympathy” for Israeli Jews among Russians,
given the large numbers of Russian-speaking Israeli Jews. This is questionable as it pertains to
popular opinion, though more than likely this does accurately represent the position of the
Russian government. “Being anti-West, anti-NATO, we are not against Israel by principle.”40 In
other words, there is not innate (geopolitical) reason for Russians and Jews, as manifested by
their national states, to be enemies. On the other hand, “when we are polite to the Israelis, that
doesn’t mean we are going to betray Hezbollah… We have very good relations with Israel, and
we don’t want to make these relations worse, but at the same time, [we are] with Hezbollah now
as strategical [sic] allies. It’s very important.”41 Short-term strategy, he seems to imply, compels
Russia to support forces bent on Israel’s destruction. Taken together, these statements seem to
suggest that geopolitical, long-term relations between Russians and Jews as nations will not
always match short-term relations between Moscow and Jerusalem.
Second, within Israel – or, perhaps, within the whole of world Jewry – Russia and the
United States are bound to support different interests.
We have completely different goals. For example, if we [the Unites States and Russia]
support two countries or two movements, always, always, by [sic] geopolitical reasons,
we are supporting different poles… For example, we [Russia] are supporting one
tendency in Israel; American – completely other…We have good relations with Israel;
the United States has good relations with Israel; but there are two Israels. There is the
geopolitically Atlanticist sea power Israel, represented by Israeli oligarchy, Israeli racism,
[the] pro-American, pro-Western core of Israeli society. But there is Israeli traditions
[sic], they are different.42
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This is the closest statement Dugin makes to anti-Semitism. While he does portray Jews and the
evolution of Jewish religion and culture – a process 5000 years in the making – as completely
subject to the influences of major outside powers (and, perhaps, teleologically dependent on
them as well), he applies this same logic to all peoples, traditions, and histories.
He may easily be called a Russian supremacist and would probably agree that he is a
nationalist, but he is not necessarily an anti-Semite because he does not reserve for Jews special
fear, hatred, or discrimination. If the Kremlin – or at least one part of it – is truly are enamored of
Dugin’s theories, it is possible that they could share his imperialist Russian supremacism without
anti-Semitism. The problem, however, is how they could so easily accept Dugin while rejecting
his influences and intellectual ancestors.

Lev Gumilev
One of Dugin’s primary inspirations, Lev Gumilev, the Soviet ethnologist and historian
(of sorts) who championed Eurasianism, expressed more easily identifiable anti-Semitic views,
including in his academic work.
Gumilev’s work dealt in abstract concepts like “passionarity” and “ethnos” which were
about as clear and socio-scientifically valid as Roman numen. According to Gumilev,
“passionarity” was “the powerful impulse which pulls the human towards obtaining some sort of
unnecessary benefit, in particular, posthumous honor.”43 Vladimir Putin himself once used the
term in a public address, though with a slightly different meaning, suggesting Gumilev also has
some posthumous influence within the Kremlin. “Ethnos” translates roughly to what in English
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would be an ethnic group, or the definition of “nation” used in the term “nation state.” It is
precisely regarding different kinds of ethnoi that Gumilev revealed his anti-Semitism:
Lev [Gumilev], battle-scarred after his academic conflicts, found an odd association with
the serious anti-Semitic fringe of the nationalist movement. His antipathy towards Jews
appears to have grown over time; while he had always been known to make the odd antiSemitic remark, many of his childhood friends, such as Gerstein and the Mandelstams,
were Jewish and had found it (mostly) harmless. It seems likely that, driven by the
trauma of the camps (which nurtured his already horrible temper), his conflict with his
mother’s entourage, and his regular association with voluble anti-Semites, Lev’s
prejudices grew. In her memoirs, Gerstein calls the older Gumilev an ‘anti-Semite’.
Many also regarded a book he published in 1965 on the Khazars (a tribe living in the
Caspian region between the seventh and the tenth centuries that had converted to
Judaism) as a thinly veiled piece of anti-Jewish propaganda: Khazars were described in
the work as a ‘chimera’ or a parasitic ethnos. Meanwhile, the reputation of his associates
rubbed off on him, colouring his reputation in scholarly circles.
In 1971, he met Sergey Melnik, who was a regular at the VOOPIK [The All-Russian
Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments and Culture] gatherings in
Moscow. He introduced Lev to the underground journal Veche, which published fringe
articles with anti-Semitic overtones.44
Gumilev’s Eurasianism was not characterized by mechanical geopolitics the way Dugin’s
is. His formless ontology of semi-physical psychological forces of social cohesion and halfmythical steppe civilizations allowed him to make normative judgements on the spiritual
worthiness of different ethnoi. As Clover plainly demonstrates, he did so with abandon, likely as
a response to his own life and circumstances, rather than any sort of deliberate and careful study
of the past.
Gumilev may have earned his place among the handful of intellectuals favored by the
Kremlin because of his relationship – both biographical and spiritual – with the Soviet Union.
Gumilev’s experiences under Soviet rule were, it is not difficult to say, tragic at best. His father,
the famous poet Nikolai Gumilev, was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1921 – two years after he
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divorced the even more famous poet, Anna Akhmatova, Lev’s mother. Lev spent a total of 14
years in Siberian prison camps all before the of 60. He generally led a painful, solitary, and
frustrated life in which he was deprived of family, friends, and meaningful professional
achievement by misfortune, the Soviets, his own shortcomings, or all three.
And yet, despite all of this, his spiritual connection to the Soviet Union was immense.
A staunch anti-communist, Gumilev was nonetheless surprisingly embittered by the
collapse of the USSR, which occurred six months before his own death in 1992. Like
many of his fellow prisoners, he later became possessed by an odd patriotism – an
inexplicable loyalty to the homeland (and even the regime) that had stolen his health, his
years and his friends. It was a type of Stockholm syndrome which produced some
singularly odd scholarship: paeans to Russia’s imperial greatness, the organic character of
the Russian Empire (and later the Soviet Union) as a singular super-ethnos, or
civilization, whose many nations willingly joined Russia not as conquests, but as
voluntary subjects of the tsar’s imperial greatness. Gumilev even purported to be able to
quantify the amount of physical passionarity remaining in Russia, a civilization which, he
predicted, was in the middle of its 1,200 year lifespan.45
Putin seems, based on his public proclamations and decisions, to have similar feelings
about the Soviet Union, simultaneously appreciating its internal contradictions, weaknesses, and
insurmountable flaws, but also pining for its greatness, its sense of purpose, its vast (forced)
dominion. He famously called the breakup of the Soviet Union “a major geopolitical disaster of
the century.”46 (This statement has also been translated as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of
the century” by non-Kremlin sources.47 The actual words he used were “крупнейшая
геополитическая катастрофа века.”48 Although this is a matter open to interpretation, the
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superlative form of “large,” “крупнейший,” suggest not only importance but importance above
and beyond other things – i.e. “greatest.”)
Although that speech was made in 2005, largely before Eurasianist and nationalist
influences were noticed in Putin’s rhetoric, the statement may be elucidated by applying to it
Gumilev’s and Dugin’s definition of geopolitics: that the collapse of the Soviet Union
fragmented the great Eurasian civilization and dissipated its passionarity. In some ways, Putin
sees his job as restoring that passionarity – that overarching purpose and devotion which is the
raison d’être of the state and civilization. He has remarked that “Anyone who doesn't regret the
passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who wants it restored has no brains.”49
While Gumilev’s thinking appears to have had an effect (either direct or indirect) on
Putin’s rhetoric and possibly also his thinking, there is no evidence that Putin subscribes to his
classification of Jews as a parasitic people. Gumilev is one of the better examples of antiSemitism addressed here, and almost certainly one of the best examples available in the
Eurasianist tradition. Nonetheless, the direct inheritance on Putin of that anti-Semitism cannot be
found. It is possible that most of Gumilev’s theories can be maintained with internal integrity –
such as they have – without anti-Semitism. That is, accepting that Jews are uniquely worse than
other groups is not a philosophical prerequisite for believing in ethnoi, passonarity, and the
special status of Russians within Eurasian civilization.
However, the mere possibility of ideology à la carte does not suffice to explain why
Gumilev’s structure of ethnoi and passionarity have gained traction while some of the substance
of his theories – anti-Semtisim in particular – has not. Some outside explanation is required.
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Ivan Ilyin
If Gumilev was one of the clearest examples of a Eurasianist anti-Semite, Ilyin is the
other. Originally from an aristocratic, Moscow family, he studied law at Moscow State
University (then Imperial Moscow University), during which time he careened in his political
tastes between anarchism and liberalism. After the Bolshevik revolution, he was exiled from the
country as a “White philosopher” who disfavored Lenin’s revolution – that much was true – and
was therefore undesirable. He then taught in Germany, where he was active in the community of
exiled, anti-Bolshevik, Russian intellectuals. As an alternative to Bolshevism, he embraced
Eurasianism for its spiritual and quasi-religious dimension which Bolshevism lacked.
For similar reasons, he was a great fan of Mussolini, who he saw as successful in uniting
Italians in a deeply historic and spiritually authentic rite of patriotism. When Hitler rose to power
in Germany, Ilyin supported him as well (even at one point working for Joseph Goebbels),
simultaneously condemning German Jews for opposing him, which he ascribed to uniform
support among Jews for Bolshevim.50
Ilyin argue[d] that the Russian state—by which he meant the old Russian Empire and its
geographic descendant, the Soviet Union—is a unique geo-historical entity tied together
by the spiritual unity of the Euro-Asiatic nations. In his view, Hitler’s National Socialism,
Mussolini’s fascism, and the Russian White movement were very similar and “spiritually
close.” He described them as sharing a “common and united enemy, patriotism, sense of
honor, voluntary-sacrificial service, an attraction to dictatorial discipline, to spiritual
renewal and the revival/rebirth of their country, and the search for a new social justice.”
An opponent of both Soviet communism and Western democracy, Ilyin envisioned a
“special” path for Russia, based on the promotion of the Orthodox Church and traditional
values that would bring about a spiritual renewal of the Russian people, who at the
moment he believed were under the influence of Western political and social constructs.
Despite the horrors of World War II and the defeat of Germany and Italy, Ilyin did not
reject fascist ideology. In 1948, he wrote about the mistakes that Hitler had made, but not
about the flaws of his ideology. He still recognized it as a just and healthy national50
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patriotic idea, voicing his hope that Francisco Franco in Spain and António de Oliveira
Salazar in Portugal would avoid the mistakes that Hitler had made and succeed in their
own quests.51
Clearly, Ilyin’s passion for fascism has not been inherited by the modern Russian
political class. Although some figures marginally associated with the current regime have made
use of fascist and Nazi iconography and symbolism, the ideas of fascism and Nazism specifically
are utterly lacking from the Kremlin.52 The lengths to which the current powers go to define their
opponents as fascists and Nazis – especially to the domestic population – suggests the enduing
enmity and disgust with which fascism and Nazism are regarded. Similarly, despite Ilyin’s own
Wagnerian anti-Semitism, the intellectual legacy of his theory contributes only indirectly to
modern anti-Semitism.
Ilyin introduced into the Russian political vocabulary the term “world backstage”
(“мировая закулиса”), by which he meant some secret, Western-dominated, conspiratorial
cabal, secretly pulling the strings of world affairs. While he never explicitly connected the idea
with Jews per se, the well-known conspiracy theory of the secret world order often includes Jews
as its masterminds: “In the broader sense, this term implies that the officially elected leaders of
the West are, in fact, puppets of the world’s true rulers: businessmen, Masonic agents, and, often,
Jews. These days, that phrase seems omnipresent in Russian discourse and state-controlled
media.”53
However, the concept is not original to Ilyin. Its occurrence in modern Russian discourse
cannot be directly traced to him. Indeed, as Albats indicated, conspiracy theories in Russia,
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including or especially among the political elite, are so common in part because in Russia they
are sometimes true.54 Both the Bolshevik Revolution and the August Putsch that ended the
Soviet Union were the results of conspiracies, planned and carried out by a handful of powerful
but little-known men in secret to wrest control of government forcefully away from another
leader. Every leader of the Soviet Union in between was selected through a process – not of open
competition, debate, and popular selection – but of back-room dealing and secret maneuvers at
the very heights of power. Had Ilyin not introduced the concept of the “world backstage,”
someone would have needed to invent it just to write the Russian news.
Ilyin is considered to be a particular favorite philosopher of Putin’s: He assigned the
regional governors of Russia to read Our Tasks (Наши Задачи, also translated Our Mission)
over the 2014 winter break.55 Unlike with Gumilev, it is easy to explain why Putin might revere
Ilyin’s work yet not share his anti-Semitism. Ilyin primarily hated Jews because of their
connection to – and, he believed, universal support for – Bolshevism. For the former KGB agent
who clearly views the U.S.S.R. with nostalgia, this support may be a virtue where for Ilyin it was
a vice.

Nikolai Danilevsky
Nikolai Danilevsky provides what is likely the best example of the Eurasianist thinking,
which, while not incompatible with anti-Semitism, excludes it. His proto-Eurasianist theory was
part of a larger effort to distinguish and classify different civilizational types based on cultural
and linguistic similarities and differences. This was part of a project of opposing both the
Slavophile and Westernizer positions, which advocated for Russia to achieve modernity through
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embracing and developing its native cultural and historic traditions, or through adopting and
replicating the models of Western Europe, respectively. Danilevsky rejected both on the grounds
that they defined “modernity” and civilizational achievement by comparison with the West.
According to his taxonomy, Russia’s sense of backwardness compared to the West made as
much sense as a snake feeling stunted compared to a giraffe. (Danilevsky was a biologist by
training.)
Instead, Russia’s path of development was completely different and incomparable to the
“Roman-Germanic World,” and indeed to any of the other historico-cultural types:
Anticipating the later theories of Spengler, Toynbee, and Huntington, Danilevskii
distinguished multiple civilisations in the past, of which Romano–Germanic or European
was only one. Other historico–cultural types included Egyptian, Chinese, Assyrian–
Babylonian–Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Arabian. ‘These
types are not evolutionary stages on the ladder of gradual perfectibility … but entirely
different plans—plans without any common denominator—in which each entity evolves
in a specific and distinct fashion towards the multiformity and perfection within its
reach’…).56
In a similar vein to Dugin, Danilevsky’s model (though not necessarily its implications) is
descriptive, not normative in the way Gumilev’s was. He counts the Jewish historico-cultural
type as one among many, but does not disparage it nor any other specifically. His proposition
that Russia should not try to adopt the development model of a different civilization depends on
the proposition that each historico-cultural type can only follow its own unique path, and
therefore ought not to try others – not that other paths were inherently, objectively worse.
He developed laws for the development and identification of these types, which are of
use in evaluating his theory for anti-Semitism:
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First, it must be noted that the historico-cultural types are precisely what their name
implies: historical. They can come and go. At the time Danilevsky was writing, Jews would not
have counted as an extant historico-cultural type because they lacked at least one of the
necessary points: political independence. (Whether the State of Israel would satisfy that
requirement now is an interesting question, but not a germane one.)
Arguments could also be made that Jews in Russia during Danilevsky’s time lacked, in
the necessary or relevant ways, all five features of historico-cultural types. Their linguistic
foundation, at least in terms of common speech, was not Hebrew but Yiddish, a pidgin with
German and influences of Russian and other languages. They had no political independence
anywhere in the world. Their most important contribution to human civilization, ethical
monotheism, had been adopted by a majority of the world, while they had taken on many of the
cultural trappings of their many home countries in diaspora. They had no internal diversity
ethnically. (This point is debatable.) Their civilization was evolving, but not growing. In other
words, Jews were at most a former civilization, at least an utterly spent historical force.
Danielvsky’s argument provides the best example of the status of Jews in Eurasianist and
proto-Eurasianist theories: irrelevance. This is because the context for civilizational theories,
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including Danilevsky’s historico-cultural types and Eurasianism, is the defense of Russian
culture and civilization (such as it is perceived) against the West, including not only Western
states but also Western culture, economic influence, religious institutions, and universalist
ideological exports – namely, liberalism.
Putin has adopted this definition of self and enemy in his rhetoric, and he depicts his role
as reinvigorating the Russian state and, by extension, its cult of patriotism: “My sacred duty is to
bring together the Russian people, unite the people around clear tasks. We have one fatherland,
one people and a common future.”58 That fatherland has, in some of Putin’s explanations, a
distinctly Eurasianist character, consisting of not just a nation state but a collection of nations
united in one overarching civilization, led and dominated by (ethnic) Russians:
About the special character of Russian statehood, Ivan Ilyin wrote: “Do not eradicate,
suppress, enslave other peoples [lit. ‘other blood’]; do not strangle a foreign and
heterodox life, but give everyone a breath and a great Fatherland of respect for all,
reconcile them all, let them all pray in their own way, work in their own way, and involve
the best from everywhere in the state and cultural construction.”
The rod that fastens the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian people, Russian
culture. Our opponents and all kinds of provocateurs will try will all their might to wrest
this rod from Russia – through false conversations about the right of Russians to selfdetermination, about “racial purity,” about the necessity “to finish the business of 1991
and finally destroy the empires seated on the neck of the Russian people.” Ultimately, to
force the people to destroy their own Fatherland with their very hands. (emphasis added)
(Именно об этом особом характере русской государственности писал Иван Ильин:
«Не искоренить, не подавить, не поработить чужую кровь, не задушить
иноплеменную и инославную жизнь, а дать всем дыхание и великую Родину всех
соблюсти, всех примирить, всем дать молиться по-своему, трудиться по-своему и
лучших отовсюду вовлечь в государственное и культурное строительство».
Стержень, скрепляющая ткань этой уникальной цивилизации – русский народ,
русская культура. Вот как раз этот стержень разного рода провокаторы и наши
противники всеми силами будут пытаться вырвать из России – под насквозь
фальшивые разговоры о праве русских на самоопределение, о «расовой чистоте», о
необходимости «завершить дело 1991 года и окончательно разрушить империю,
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сидящую на шее у русского народа». Чтобы в конечном счете – заставить людей
своими руками уничтожать собственную Родину.)59
The Jews, to the extent that they facilitate the spread of European institutions (especially
economic ones) are targets of ideological attack by Eurasianists, but unlike their position of evil
primacy in the ideologies Nazi Germany or Western neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and
skinheads, they are not the prime enemy of Russian civilization. They couldn't be the prime
enemy, because they don’t pose a serious threat. The Jews can’t break up the empire. The Jews
can’t rob Russia of its culture. The Jews can’t preach about racial purity. They’re only a
civilizational, existential threat as the agents of the real enemy: Western, and especially
American, global hegemony. Notably, this is directly contradictory to the Soviet-era conception
that the West was controlled by a secretive cabal of Jews.
While many Eurasianists and other kinds of Russian nationalists and adherents of
civilizational theories are often anti-Semites, including Ilyin and Gumilev, the coincidence of the
two intellectual trends should be viewed as correlational, not causational. The same people who
find quasi-historical theses about geographical determinism and civilizational predestination
convincing are likely also those who believe in selective morality – that some people or groups
of people have different moral standing than others. However, it is not philosophically or
logically necessary to hold anti-Semitic views in order to believe in the world view advocated by
Eurasianists.
Ultimately, the influence of nationalist and Eurasianist thinking on the Kremlin is helpful
but not sufficient in explaining the Kremlin’s Jewish policies. The Kremlin, including Putin
himself, appear very supportive of Eurasianist and national-imperialist projects. Danilevsky’s
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theory of unique developmental paths, which certainly had influence on later theorists and
appears to have some pull on the Kremlin itself, does not require denigration or animosity toward
other historico-cultural types. Ilyin’s anti-Semitism can be excised from his larger theories as a
coincidence of his time and place – the struggle over Bolshevism is long over. Moreover, Ilyin’s
anti-Semitism is inseparable from his primary critique of Bolshevism, which is its total lack of
spirituality. This is a critique that the Putin regime appears to share in some part, as evidenced by
its close association with the Russian Orthodox Church. It is also possible for the Kremlin (or
some of its elements) to embrace Dugin’s ideology and maintain pro-Semitic Jewish policies, as
the two are mutually compatible. All of these apparent paradoxes are resolvable – though some
more comfortably than others.
The one paradox that cannot be resolved is the Kremlin’s homage to Gumilev’s theories
but not his anti-Semitic application of those theories. For those that would argue that the Putin
government is more ideological than pragmatic, the selective endorsement of Gumilev would
appear to be an inexplicable counterexample. The argument that Eurasianist ideology is
influential in the Kremlin, and that it allows room for such policies, does not adequately explain
the Putin regime’s policies. Another explanation is required as to why the Putin government
would want to avoid anti-Semitism in the first place. The regime’s Jewish policies suggest that it
is not as ideological as is sometimes believed.
The “Syringe” Hypothesis
There is considerable debate about the role of ideology, especially Eurasianist ideology,
in Putin’s regime. Charles Clover has written extensively on the influence of Eurasianist
philosophers on the Kremlin in Black Wind, White Snow, and gives ample evidence to suggest
that many in the highest echelons of power – though not necessarily Putin himself – endorse
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Eurasianist ideas. Alternatively, Anton Shekhovtsov suggests in Russia and the Western Far
Right that the Putin regime’s only ideology is self-preservation: “It only syringes very specific
ideas into the body of the Russian society in order to achieve particular purposes. This is a
typical mode of operation for authoritarian, not totalitarian, states that occasionally, rather than
permanently, engage in political mobilisation of the society.”60
The possibility remains that Putin personally endorses Eurasianist ideas, that his quotes
of Ilyin and paraphrases of Gumilev reflect his true thinking, that he endorses their overall
worldview without also adopting anti-Semitism. But it’s also possible that so much sound and
fury signifies nothing. To borrow Shekhovtsov’s term, the Kremlin’s use of “ideological
syringes” allows for other explanations of its simultaneous far-right sympathies and proSemitism.
First, this theory implies the possibility of future change in Kremlin policies. Without
ideological commitments, the current position of Putin’s government will only last as long as
Putin believes they are useful to him. “Stalin [like] Putin used ideologies extensively for
propagandistic purposes and for the legitimization of their personal power. However, given the
fact that they were concerned only about personal power, these two leaders were extremely
flexible and open to the idea of changing the country’s ideological course in any direction.”61 If,
for example, a sharp and unexpected economic crisis caused mass protests in the streets on the
scale of the Bolotnaya or Navalny protests, the Kremlin, according to this model, would choose
an ideology that justified it’s actions and policies and reassigned blame, and “inject” it into the
debate. If the threat against Putin’s power were perceived as serious enough, i.e. if Putin believed
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that a color revolution was likely or imminent – there is little reason to doubt that he would use
anti-Semitic tropes to blame shadowy finance figures for the crisis.
The “syringe” hypothesis suggests that any idea or ideology that the Kremlin find useful
can be injected into the political discourse thanks to the almost total domination of mass media
and political speech by state-controlled outlets. If the ideas of long-dead and forgotten minor
philosopher like Ilyin could be resurrected, the theory would hold, so then could one of the most
successful prejudices in Russian history. This may not be the case.
The first reason anti-Semitism may be of little use to the Kremlin is that, despite the deep
historical precedent of official anti-Semitism in Russia, modern, popular or “street” antiSemitism is not easily connected to politics. Gibson and Howard find that
Our most important conclusion is that anti-Jewish prejudice reflects personality
characteristics such as dogmatism and xenophobia, and is essentially impervious to
influence from perceptions of external economic and political stress. This latter finding
no doubt accounts for the failure of anti-Jewish sentiment to become pernicious in Russia
during the 1990s. Throughout the country’s attempt at democratization, economic and
political stress have been at high levels; some Russians hold predispositions towards
intolerance; but the two factors have not joined forces to produce reactions against Jewish
Russians.62
They propose a number of explanations which suggest that anti-Semitism is an unfit tool for
political mobilization.
At least one part of the answer is that not enough Russians are predisposed to believe
scurrilous allegations against Jews. Like the ‘race card’ in American politics, if racist
predispositions are not sufficiently widespread, then the limited response to proffers of
racist appeals generates few political benefits. Thus, in some sense our understanding of
this problem does indeed rely upon the conclusion that anti-Semitism in Russia is not
widespread enough to be mobilized successfully in electoral politics.63
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Although Russia’s politics in the intervening decade have become clearly non-electoral in the
relevant way, lacking as they do true competition, fairness, and freedom, they still serve as
legitimization rituals from which the government draws support and a strange, illegitimate
mandate. The uses of anti-Semitism would be more or less the same as in a truly electoral
system: to build support and gain a governing mandate. The “race card” analogy still suggests
that, so to speak, the Russian people are not buying it.
Another possible explanation is that Jews are not of sufficient salience in Russia to be
easily scapegoated:
Optimism about Russia’s political and economic future seems to be associated with a
growth in negative, as well as positive, sentiments towards Jews… finding whom to
blame is not necessarily easy or even possible, but for many Russians it is likely to make
more sense to blame the Communists, the nomenklatura, the legacy of Communism,
oligarchs, the West, etc., than to blame Jews.64
This is likely related to the steep decline in the Jewish population of Russia since the mid-20th
century. At the time of the first All-Union Population Census in 1926, there were about 567,000
Jews in the Russian Socialist Republic (out of a total of nearly 2.6 million in the Soviet Union).65
The number of Jews in Russia had declined only slightly by 1989, to about 537,00.66 By 2010,
that number declined to 230,000 en route to an estimated 110,000 by 2050.67 The fall of the
Soviet Union makes the comparison even stronger. A Muscovite comparing the population of
Jews in his country (the U.S.S.R. before 1991 and the Russian Federation thereafter) between
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1926 and 2010 would have seen a 91 percent drop. In other words, there are fewer than one tenth
the Jews in the relevant political entity to exploit for political gain.
Contemporary Russia also appears to be less strongly anti-Semitic than it has been in the
past and that it is widely assumed still to be. Gibson and Howard find that:
some research based on multiple indicators has discovered that anti-Semitism seemed to
be neither widespread nor virulent. For instance, Gibson and Duch conclude that
expressed anti-Semitism among residents of the Moscow oblast ‘is more uncommon in
Moscow [in 1990] [sic] than many (including us) had suspected’. Their findings from a
comparable survey in 1990 in the European portion of the former Soviet Union support
the same conclusion. Moreover, based on his analysis of a survey of Russians conducted
in 1992, Furman writes: ‘Thus, no mass anti-Semitism was revealed by the survey (our
data agree in this regard with the data of other, analogous surveys), and a Jewish pogrom
seems less likely than some sort of “Caucasian” pogrom.’68
Discussing their survey methodology, they find hopeful results:
It is noteworthy that a clear majority rejects the anti-Semitic slander in three of the four
measures, with nearly two-thirds of the Russians repudiating the view that Jews more
than others are responsible for the country’s problems. Thus, anti-Semitic prejudice does
not seem to be as widespread in contemporary Russia as might be expected in light of the
country’s history of ill-treatment of Jews.69
While Shlapentokh does not go so far, and still considers Russia’s levels of popular antiSemitism alarming, he finds corroborating that evidence that they may be lower than is often
thought:
Anti-Semitism in Russia today [2008] is lower than it has been in the last seven decades.
Jews in Russia are much less inclined to hide their ethnic origin or their interest in Jewish
culture and religion. According to data cited in Ryvkina’s comprehensive book, How
Jews Live in Russia , the proportion of Jews who talked about their involvement in
Jewish culture (considered a taboo in Soviet times) increased by three times in 2004 in
comparison with 1995. In the same period, the number of Jews who declared themselves
as believers in Judaism increased by 50 percent, while the number of regular visitors to
synagogue increased by 11 times and the number of members of Jewish organizations
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increased by almost 5 times. The number of Jews who suffered from anti-Semitism
declined from 75 percent to 55 percent.70
More recent data from the Levada Center paints a similar picture – that anti-Semitism is
relatively high compared to other European countries (and, of course, compared to the ideal
level, which is none) but relatively low compared to historical standards and Weimar
comparisons.
Currently, only 8% of Russians are negative about Jews, but experts point out several
levels of anti-Semitic aggression: a stable core of anti-Semitism and xenophobia (8-16%
of respondents), those who support anti-Semitic and xenophobic clichés (18-35%), those
who believe that ethnic Russians should have advantages over others or that the president
should be Russian (40-65%). At the same time, anti-Semitism is very marginalized and is
concentrated on the periphery of civil and social life, and anti-Semitic stereotypes and
clichés have significantly weakened, but do not leave mass consciousness, the report
says. Nevertheless, the "Jewish question" has lost its urgency and relevance, as Russian
society is dominated by a calm-respectful or neutral-indifferent attitude toward Jews,
experts say. The main threat to the rise of xenophobic attitudes in general and antiSemitism in particular is the economic crisis, adds Kanner: "That's why we are trying to
institutionalize the counteraction system - to conduct research, conferences, to cooperate
with the authorities."
(Сейчас к евреям относятся негативно лишь 8% россиян, но эксперты выделяют
несколько уровней антисемитской агрессии: устойчивое ядро антисемитов и
ксенофобов (8–16% опрошенных), те, кто поддерживает антисемитские и
ксенофобские клише (18–35%), те, кто считает, что русские должны иметь
преимущества перед другими или что президент должен быть русским (40–65%).
При этом антисемитизм очень маргинализирован и концентрируется на периферии
гражданской и социальной жизни, а антисемитские стереотипы и клише
существенно ослабли, но не уходят из массового сознания, говорится в докладе.
Тем не менее «еврейский вопрос» утратил свою остроту и актуальность, в
российском обществе доминирует спокойно-уважительное или нейтральноравнодушное отношение к евреям, констатируют эксперты. Основную угрозу
подъема ксенофобских настроений вообще и антисемитизма в частности несет
экономический кризис, добавляет Каннер: «Поэтому мы и пытаемся
институционализировать систему противодействия – проводить исследования,
конференции, сотрудничать с властью».)71
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Quite simply, there don’t appear to be enough committed anti-Semites in Russia to make a
significant electoral difference (unless, of course, a direct challenger to Putin for the presidency
were Jewish, in which case the popular opposition to a Jewish president would likely make a
difference).
Interestingly, the tendency of Russians to believe anti-Semitism conspiracy theories and
alternative histories may also be declining. According to a Levada Center survey, respondents
indicated Holocaust denial a significantly smaller proportion of the time in May 2015 than in
October 2007.
HAVE YOU HEARD OF “THE HOLOCAUST,” AND IF SO, DO YOU
PERSONALLY THINK THAT AT THAT TIME IN GERMANY AND ITS OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES THE JEWISH NATION REALLY WAS EXTERMINATED, OR
STORIES ABOUT IT ARE EXAGGERATED?
(СЛЫШАЛИ ЛИ ВЫ О ПРОБЛЕМЕ “ХОЛОКОСТА”, И ЕСЛИ ДА, КАК ВЫ
ЛИЧНО ДУМАЕТЕ, В ГЕРМАНИИ И НА ОККУПИРОВАННЫХ ЕЮ
ТЕРРИТОРИЯХ В ТЕ ГОДЫ ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНО ЦЕЛЕНАПРАВЛЕННО
ИСТРЕБЛЯЛАСЬ ЕВРЕЙСКАЯ НАЦИЯ, ИЛИ РАССКАЗЫ ОБ ЭТОМ
ПРЕУВЕЛИЧЕНЫ?)72
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At that time the nation was really was exterminated
(В те годы действительно истреблялась целая
нация)
Stories about it are greatly exaggerated
(Рассказы об этом значительно преувеличены)
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Have not heard about it
13

8

12

12

(Ничего не слышал(а) об этом)
Too hard to answer
(Затрудняюсь ответить)

A recent study from the World Jewish Congress and the Russian Jewish Congress supports this
trend, and suggests plausible explanations for why.
Russia today has one of the lowest levels of anti-Semitism in the world and the lowest in
Europe, according to a survey conducted in 2015-2016 by the Russian Jewish Congress
ahead of the first Moscow International Conference on Combating anti-Semitism, cosponsored by the World Jewish Congress.
The survey found that only 8 percent of respondents expressed a negative attitude toward
Jews and that 90% of Russians today are aware of the Holocaust. The study found that
Gypsies and Chechens evoked the most antipathetic attitude among respondents, as well
as xenophobia toward Americans, Arabs and Azerbaijanis.73
The most likely explanation for this dramatic decline in popular anti-Semitism in Russia
may be attributed not only to the dramatic decrease in the Jewish population, but also to the
abandonment of a coordinated, mass anti-Semitic program by Russian elites. While the siloviki
likely practice employment discrimination in the Russian government, Russian mass media since
the 2000 have been devoid of the kind of large-scale anti-Semitic messages characteristic of the
Soviet era, in which “In media, novels and movies, Jews were almost never shown in a positive
light. A Jewish name could only appear in a negative context.”74 By contrast:
Putin’s close confidant, the famous film director Nikita Mikhalkov, made a movie in
2007 called 12 (a remake of the American movie 12 Angry Men ), which denounces
73
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anti-Semitism and other ethnic prejudices in Russia. The screening of such a film would
be absolutely impossible not only between the 1940s and the 1980s, but even in Yeltsin’s
time. According to Moskovskii Komsomolets, in November 2007, Putin invited
journalists and gave a public showing of this movie in his residence (Galimova, 2007).
He reportedly expressed his high satisfaction with the piece.75
At least some of the credit for the near eradication of anti-Semitism from mass entertainment in
Russia could be attributed to Putin, who has exerted direct or indirect control over almost every
aspect and outlet of mass information and entertainment in the country since the early 2000s.
Putin could therefore also share the blame for what followed. The consensus based on
polling data, which are always subject to skepticism in Russia, is that Jews have been replaced
by Central Asians, Caucasians, Westerners (Americans especially), and Chechens as the default
scapegoats in Russia. At times, Ukrainians have also occupied a spot high atop the list of
perceived enemies of Russia. Crimean Tatars have suffered some of the worst repressions since
the annexation of Crimea: They have the unfortunate distinction of being both Ukrainian by
(former) citizenship and Muslim by confession, making them targets of persecution twice over.
Their status as former victims of mass deportation under Stalin has not forestalled the jailing of
several of their leaders – most notably Akhtem Chiygoz deputy leader of the Crimean Tatar
Mejlis – under questionable circumstances. An April 2017 pronouncement from the International
Court of Justice against persecution of the Crimean Tatars has had little effect.76
It is difficult to conclude the directionality of the regime’s Jewish policies and public
opinion. According to the “syringe” theory, the government could use its domination of mass
information and political discourse to “inject” anti-Semitism into the population at will. It has
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clearly not done so. If the theory is incorrect, the Kremlin’s options of ideological positions are
limited based on what the Russian population is prepared and likely to accept. Rather than
manipulating political discourse and culture with complete dexterity to meet its needs, the
Russian government may find itself in a position much closer to that of a democratic
government, fairly tightly constrained to philosophical and ideological positions that the
population is prepared to accept. Based on survey data, the Russian population is historically and
increasingly resilient to anti-Semitism since the turn of the millennium.
Alternately, if the theory is correct, then the drop in anti-Semitism since the beginning of
Putin’s first presidential term is directly attributable to policies of his government. Consequently,
the observed trends are wholly subject to manipulation and could be reversed at any time. The
longevity and stability of the Putin government’s pro-Jewish policies therefore requires further
explanation. Since Putin took power, the Russian government’s economic policy has changed
drastically, as have political rights, the Constitution, the judiciary, Russia’s foreign policy
(including perhaps the underlying goals of foreign policy in addition to the policies themselves),
and arguably the nature of the social contract. Rhetorical changes from the president and other
Kremlin officials have accompanied each of these shifts. The government’s Jewish policies have
been one domain of remarkable consistency, which the “syringe” hypothesis cannot explain by
itself.

The Foreign Policy Hypothesis
Israel
In contrast to each theory discussed so far, another theory explains Putin’s and his
government’s pro-Semitic policies as facets of a larger foreign policy. Yevgenia Albats suggests
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that, to some extent, the Russian government’s relationship with its Jewish population is dictated
by its geopolitical posture in the Middle East:
Russia pretty much lost its relationship with Arab countries after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. At the same time, Israel came on the map, partially because there is a huge
Russian-speaking population in Israel, partially because there are a lot of Jews – powerful
Jews – in Russia who have some aspirations for Israel, partially because Israel is a
developed nation. It’s a great start-up nation and it was pragmatically better for Russia to
do [business] with Israel relevant to its ends. So definitely it was connected to its foreign
policy.77
This proposition is unique among analyses of Putin’s Jewish policies, and warrants more
research. It’s implications, based on what is already known of Russian foreign policy, are
significant. As Albats alluded, the nature of the Russian-Israeli relationship is multifaceted, and
Israel could play any of several different roles in the foreign policy of Putin’s government.
The first facet of Russian-Israeli relations is the large number of Russophone Israelis. As
of 2016, there were about 1.5 million Russian-speaking Israelis, the vast majority of whom had
immigrated from Russia or Ukraine.78 According to Agnia Grigas’s work on Putin’s use of
“compatriots” in foreign policy, Russian-speaking Israelis may be a sizeable and important
compatriot community.
The present-day concept of the Russian compatriot both stems from and relates to a
broader understanding of the Russian nation… The first conception emphasizes the
[Soviet] Union (or imperial) identity… According to this conceptualization of Russian
nationhood, Russian compatriots would include all former citizens of the USSR and their
descendants. A second way to conceptualize the Russian nation is to include the entire
community of Eastern Slavs… The third conception of the Russian nation inclines
instead to a broader vision, including all who use Russian as their first or habitual
language, regardless of their ethnicity.79
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Jews are definitely excluded from some of the definitions of Russian compatriots. Indeed, Grigas
argues that one of the definitions “is aimed above all at excluding Jews and people from the
Caucasus and Central Asia.”80
The first and third conceptions of compatriots, however, apply perfectly well to
Russophone Israelis, many of whom were born in the former Soviet Union and use Russian as a
first and habitual language. For the purposes of Russian soft power, this makes Russian Jews a
potentially useful group. For the purposes of Russian expansionism and neo-imperialism, which
Grigas identifies as the primary goals of contemporary Russia compatriot policies, the
Russophone Israeli population may play a weaker version of the role played by analogous
populations in the former Soviet Republics: They give Russia a reason to claim legitimate
political interest in a country or region. While this will likely not lead to military intervention in
Israel as in Georgia and Ukraine (and possibly other countries in the future) it may help Russia
legitimate a resurgent Middle East policy, making up for its lost Arab allies. As an added benefit,
Putin’s government may also hope that Russian-speakers in Israel may be a politically malleable
voting bloc – an especially useful asset in a country that has historically been one of the closest
and most strategically important allies of the Unites States. Whether or not this is possible has
yet to be tested. Given the Russian government’s influence campaigns in elections in the United
States, the cleavage between Russophone and native “Sabra” Israelis may be exactly the kind of
social schism open to exploitation.81
Courting Russophone Israeli Jews would be significantly harder for a regime that
persecuted Jews at home – or, at least, for a regime that gained a reputation for doing so. Putin’s
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pro-Semitism may be partly motivated by an effort to gain influence with Jews in the Middle
East, which is a region of strategic importance in which Russia has lost significant influence in
the past quarter century.
The second facet of Russian-Israeli relations that Albats lists appears on its surface less
sinister. Russian businessmen and oligarchs – Jews and non-Jews alike – have interests in many
wealthy, Western, first-world countries, as do magnates and tycoons the world over. As dissident
journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza put it,
They want to rule inside Russia like it’s a third-world dictatorship, violating basic human
rights and freedoms, but they themselves want to use the privileges and the opportunities
that the Western world offers for themselves and for their families. They want to steal in
Russia and spend in the West.82
Maintaining the opportunity to flex soft power with Israel’s Russophone minority may be a way
to preserve Israel as an outlet for spending and education by the Kremlin elite outside Russia.
Israel has one of the most promising Western economies that has not yet passed a Magnitsky
Law designed to curtail the ability of Kremlin-linked siloviki-cum-oligarchs who have abused
human rights to spend money in and travel to Western countries. The United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, Estonia, and Lithuania have such laws. While avoidance of Magnitsky
sanctions cannot explain Putin’s Jewish policies before 2012, when the American Magnitsky Act
was signed, it may explain the continuation of such policies and their relationship to Russia’s
close relationship with Israel.

The Western Far-Left
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Beyond Russia’s relationship with Israel in particular, there are other blind spots
regarding Russia’s foreign policy that warrant further investigation. Péter Krekó’s research
regarding the Putin government’s support for and relationships with Western far-left parties and
forces suggests that the recent work of Clover, Shokhovtsov, and others warrants equally
thorough, complementary work on the other end of the spectrum.
The specific opinions and policies of European far-left parties regarding Jews is often
difficult to discern. One illustrative example is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
(KSČM), the most prominent far-left party in Czechia and, according to Krekó, one of the most
successful in Europe.83 The party takes a very critical approach to the Israeli policies regarding
the West Bank and Gaza and questions the legitimacy of the State of Israel per se, but stops short
of further, explicit anti-Semitism.84
One of the methods Krekó identifies that the Kremlin uses to elicit sympathy with
European far-left parties is anti-fascism:
Just as Putin’s regime simultaneously warns of the rise of the far right and supports (and
is supported by) far-right parties in Europe, the radical left’s anti-fascism is often
selective and one-sided. While radical left players usually share Putin’s concerns over the
hyperbolism of the “fascist junta in Kyiv” and criticize the EU for being ignorant, they do
not see such problems on the side of the pro-Russian “rebels”. Prominent members of the
European left all echo this view. Tsipras, in March 2014, said that the European Union
supports “a government with far-right and fascist elements, which violates the
Constitution of the country (…) And it goes into a malformed Cold War with Russia.
Pablo Iglesias, leader of Podemos, added: “the EU supported the illegal change of power
in Ukraine and the coming of a neo-Nazi party to the Ukrainian government. Some
European leaders, together with neo-Nazis, took part in public events in Ukraine, and this
is too far from European values.” But at the same time, a Die Linke delegation went to
Eastern Ukraine to have a friendly meeting with notoriously anti-Semitic leaders of the
Donetsk Republic.85
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Though Die Linke may prove to be an exception, it is possible that Putin’s government believes
– and perhaps rightly – that notorious, official anti-Semitism may weaken its ability to win
support for its causes among the Western far-left. The origins of European unification lie in the
conflagration of World War II, including the Holocaust. The European Union and its predecessor
organizations were largely formed to prevent another war. For the Kremlin to adopt policies
resembling Nazi Germany would severely undercut its ability to label its enemies as fascists and
garner support for its international objectives.
Concurrently, it would also hamper the Kremlin’s abilities to create symmetry between
itself and its European enemies.
For radical left politicians, who have more inhibitions about praising Putin and his regime
directly, a typical and more subtle argumentation is to talk about aggressors on both
sides. For example, without even mentioning the occupation of Crimea, a statement by
the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia called on "the parties" to respect the
Helsinki Accords one day before the referendum, as if Ukraine were not occupied only
by Russia – but by the EU and the US as well.86
While many far-left parties center their platforms on opposition the Washington consensus of
free trade and market capitalism, the Nazi comparison might prove too much for Western far-left
parties to associate themselves with Russia.
According to Krekó, the Putin government relies on a modicum of reasonableness to
secure support from the European far-left. “The left’s affiliation with the Kremlin is better
explained via the ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ principle, such as selective antiimperialism, anticapitalism, and anti-Americanism. Likewise, the state-controlled economy,
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which promises to keep ‘big capital’ in check, is an attractive model for many anti-capitalists.”87
Although some far-left parties may not see anti-Semitism on the part of the Russian government
as reason to sever or degrade ties with or support for Russian positions, there may be enough
other groups that would choose to disassociate themselves that they could diminish influence
with the leftist bloc writ large. It is possible that, if enough far-left parties were to diminish their
support for Russian goals, the rest would follow for the sake of bloc unity: “radical left forces are
traditionally more willing to cooperate with one another on the international and European level
than the far right. This further increases their importance.”88 That support is important for the
Putin government’s foreign policies, often giving it the sheen of legitimacy that allows its
foreign interventions to succeed. “The radical left group European United Left/Nordic Green
Left (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament supports the Kremlin with words and votes (in
78% of the cases), in the Council of Europe, and OSCE general assemblies — especially when it
comes to issues on Ukraine and Syria.”89
Radical left parties in Europe and the West more broadly may be fringe forces for now,
but by definition their ultimate purpose is to gain political power. They cannot rely exclusively
on Russian support to achieve that goal; eventually they will have to achieve popular support.
Anti-Semitism on the part of the Putin government might lose them popular support, which
would diminish their utility to the Kremlin either by causing them to pull away from the Kremlin
or by diminishing their influence domestically.
These theories are little more than speculation compared to what is now known about the
Kremlin’s courtship of the Western far-right. More research regarding the Putin government’s
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courtship of the far-left will provide a more detailed, full depiction of how Russian policy has
been shaped in response to Western institutions and political forces, and how those institutions
and forces have in turn responded to Russian policy.

The Biographical Hypothesis
Putin’s remarkable pro-Semitic policies may be inspired by his own biography, which
includes benevolent interventions by many Jews. One example is the Jewish family that shared
Putin’s communal apartment in St. Petersburg:
An elderly couple shared one room in the apartment; an observant Jewish family, with an
older daughter, Hava, shared the other. The younger Vladimir, the only child in the
communal home, remembered the elderly couple fondly, and spent as much time with
them as with his parents. They became surrogate grandparents, and he knew her as Baba
Anya. She, like his mother, possessed deep religious faith.90
An early religious experience of Putin’s may also have impressed on him that Jews are not a
threat to Orthodoxy or Russian culture as he may perceive other religions to be:
As Vladimir would later tell the story, on November 21, when he was seven weeks old,
Baba Anya and Maria walked three blocks through the winter chill to the Transfiguration
Cathedral, a yellow, eighteenth-century monument built in the neoclassical style of many
of the city’s churches, and there they secretly baptized the boy.91
Another figure who appears to have had a great impact on Putin’s life – by his own
admission – was his first judo coach: “He talked about his Jewish wrestling coach Anatolii
Rakhlin as a person who ‘probably played the crucial role in my life.’ The coach had attracted
him to serious sports and drew him away from a dangerous life on the streets.”92 The influence of
judo, and therefore of Rakhlin, on Putin’s life cannot be underestimated:

90

Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2015), 13.
91
Ibid., 12-13.
92 Shlapentokh, "Putin as a Flexible," 211.

53
The discipline and rigor of sambo, and later judo, intrigued the boy [Putin] in a way
nothing else had. The martial arts transformed his life, giving him the means of asserting
himself against larger, tougher boys. “It was a tool to assert myself in the pack,” he
would say. It also brought him a new circle of friends, especially two brothers, Arkady
and Boris Rotenberg, who would stick by him throughout his life. The martial arts gave
him an orthodoxy he found neither in religion nor in politics. It was more than mere
sport, he believed; it was a philosophy. “It was sports that dragged me off the streets,” he
once recalled. “To be honest, the courtyard wasn’t a very good environment for a kid.”93
The influence of sports and the discipline of martial arts on Putin’s life can be seen as an
influence on Putin’s priorities and policies once in office, most significantly the dedicated effort
to host the Olympic games in Russia. The seemingly illogical choice of a sub-tropical city for the
2014 Winter Games can be ascribed to Putin’s personal intervention and determination. The city
was a favorite of his, perhaps even surpassing that of his native St. Petersburg:
By now he spent more time in the presidential compound [in Sochi] than in any of the
Kremlin’s other official residences outside Moscow. It was here that he frequently held
meetings with foreign leaders, including one the day before with Jacques Chirac of
France and Gerhard Schröder of Germany, the “troika” who had publicly opposed the
American war in Iraq.94
On behalf of his beloved Sochi, he vigorously worked to lobby the International Olympic
Committee: “‘He was nice,’ Jean-Claude Killy, the French ski champion and a member of the
International Olympic Committee, explained after the vote. ‘He spoke French— he never speaks
French. He spoke English— he never speaks English. The Putin charisma can explain four
votes.’”95 Although Putin learned German as a second language to fluency as a young man, and
lived in Dresden as a KGB officer, he had, indeed, never spoken French or English in public
(with the exception of some public singing). He most likely learned those sections of his address
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phonetically, an indicator of his determination to impress the committee and secure the Olympics
for his adopted city and his country.
That determination is inseparable from his political aims: “As an avid sportsman and
fitness obsessive, a judoka, a skier, and a swimmer, Putin loved the Olympics; as a leader, he
saw hosting them as the means to affirm Russia’s return to its rightful place on the world
stage.”96 As is characteristic of Putin’s personalized rule, the status of the country is inextricably
linked with the status of its ruler. His priorities are its priorities, and his achievement is its
achievement. The Sochi Olympics were to Putin what the Field of the Cloth of Gold was for
Francis I (or, perhaps, for Henry): a feat of splendor and athletic prowess intended to impress
rivals and display the grandeur of the nation and its sovereign. This is exactly how the event was
described by government officials, Putin included, when it was announced that Sochi had been
selected:
When [Putin] returned triumphantly to Moscow, he stepped out of his jet and met
assembled reporters at the VIP hall of Vnukovo Airport. “It is, beyond any doubt, a
judgment of our country,” he declared. Only in a country desperate for affirmation could
the choice of an Olympics have loomed so disproportionately large. “Russia has risen
from its knees!” German Gref declared in Guatemala City.97
The Sochi Olympics, despite their often critical foreign coverage for sub-par
accommodations, vast corruption, and the attendant doping scandal, were a feather in Putin’s cap
domestically. Immediately after the Olympics, his approval rating inside Russia spiked to 85
percent.98 (Of course, public opinion surveys in Russia are always subject to skepticism, and the
effects of the Olympics alone are almost impossible to separate from the effects of the almost
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simultaneous invasion and annexation of Crimea within days of the closing ceremonies in
February 2014.) In this way, some of Putin’s most notable political success – both the beginning
of the serious, focused part of his life and his greatest international spectacle – are the result of
early guidance by a Jew, Rakhlin, whom Putin admires immensely.
The other formative experience in Putin’s life was his career in the KGB, which was
made possible by his early study of German. This was encouraged and mentored by Vera
Dmitrievna Gurevich and later continued by Mina Yuditskaya (now Mina Yuditskaya Berliner).
Berliner is Jewish, and now lives in Tel Aviv in an apartment Putin bought for her as a
demonstration of his appreciation for her teaching many years before.99 Putin bought the
apartment for her while on a state visit in 2005, although it was not disclosed for some years. The
private nature of the gesture (Berliner was the one who revealed it), as well as its substance,
indicate the genuineness of the gratitude that motivated it. “She [had] a deep influence on him,
and he would remember her decades later with a sentimental fondness.”100
Many of those personally close and important to Putin are rewarded with expensive gifts,
sometimes including multi-billion-dollar businesses, as in the cases of Arkady and Boris
Rotenberg, who jointly control SGM group and have over $1 billion in assets each, thanks to
their friendship with Putin stemming from their shared dojo in St. Petersburg.101 The Rotenbergs
are also of Jewish ancestry.102
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While Putin appears to have very close relationships with many Jews and does not appear
to discriminate against Jews per se, it bears mentioning that the same cannot be said of his
administration at every level. Although the scholarship on official state anti-Semitism in Russia
has been lacking recently, Evgenia Albats believes the prevalence of siloviki, or to use her term,
“epaulettes” in the Russian government has caused some backsliding toward the Soviet-era antiSemitic policies. This has been especially pronounced during Putin’s third presidential term, and
can be attributed to those in Putin’s inner circle who don’t share his pro-Semitic tendencies.103
For example, Igor Sechin and Sergey Ivanov are both anti-Semites in the KGB tradition, which
considers all Jews potential “fifth columnists” and inherently untrustworthy. (These are the
opinions of Albats, though detailed evidence is, of course, difficult to find.104) According to her,
“It’s harder for Jews to get into these governmental structures – the Kremlin, the administration,
etc. That would be because the most important decision-making sphere of the country are
controlled by KGB people.” This makes Putin an exception, having served for years in the KGB
and its successor, the FSB, but apparently having not bought into its pervasive anti-Semitism.
Albats’s analysis squares with other theories of power distribution in contemporary
Russia, which recognize that the concentration of power in Putin’s hands also concentrates
power in the hands of those around him, who by necessity have some degree of autonomy –
autonomy which has increased, especially regarding the FSB, since Putin’s return to the
presidency. “ In 2008, President Putin could influence a several government organs completely
independent from him; his power even encompassed the great and terrible fire supervision
authority. But in 2016-2017, president Putin is unable to influence a number of bodies
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independent from him. (Вот в 2008 году президент Путин мог повлиять на ряд совершенно
независимых от него органов, его могущество даже распространялось на великий и
ужасный пожарный надзор. А в 2016–2017 годах президент Путин не может повлиять на
ряд независимых от него органов.)”105
This followed closely on the heels of the prosecution of director Kirill Serebrennikov, to
which Putin expressed his opposition publicly, but which continued and even intensified
nonetheless:
Shortly after the initial questioning of Serebrennikov in May, the Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, was asked about the incident by an actor at a Kremlin reception. He
responded: “Fools”, apparently referring to the investigators. This was seen by some as a
sign from the Kremlin to stop the campaign against the director; instead, Russian
authorities have intensified it.106
If the statements were a true reflection of Putin’s policy preferences, this could be another
example of subordinate bodies – particularly the FSB – acting against Putin’s wishes, potentially
embarrassing the president (though in retrospect this seems unlikely, and it’s equally possible
that Putin was intentionally portraying himself as the good tsar surrounded by bad boyars).
The extent to which Putin’s pro-Semitic policies find their foundation in his personal
relationships with Jews also necessarily depends on the nature of Putin’s rule in general,
including the degree of autonomy which he delegates to those around him, how tolerant he is of
opposition and dissent within the inner circles of his regime, and the relationship between his
personal biography and preferences and his rule. If the most convincing explanation for Putin’s
pro-Semitism lies in the particular facts of his biography, then it would be reasonable to infer
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that other aspects of Putin’s rule and others of his policies are also inspires by his personal
experience, rather than simple managerial pragmatism or deep ideological commitments.

Conclusions
No single hypothesis presented above completely explains the Putin regime’s Jewish
policies. Any satisfactory explanation of the policy choices of a regime such as Putin’s must
address both personal and institutional causes and contexts. Consequently, a combination of
these theories is more likely to be a satisfactory explanation, or at least the beginning of one.
To create a truly robust account of the Russian Jewish policy under Putin – and, indeed,
the political context and structure surrounding it – further research is imperative. Biographies of
Putin are available in English, and can be quite useful in interpreting his policies, but they are
necessarily incomplete. Undoubtedly, Putin warrants further treatment by historians after his
death, when his life and effects on Russia can be evaluated wholly, even if the depth of those
effects may not be fully realized for years. Many of the works of the Eurasianist philosophers are
not available in English, including most notably Ilyin’s Nashi Zadachi. He and the other
philosophers mentioned were prolific, and their work should be made available for political
scientists working in English. Their work should also be evaluated for is Jewish-related content,
which can further illuminate the debate about the ideological nature of the Putin regime. Lastly,
and perhaps most urgently, the relationships between the Russian government and far-left forces
and parties in the West should be at least as extensively researched as the corresponding
relationship on the right. Péter Krekó is almost alone in pursuing this immensely important facet
of international affairs.
The most convincing existing evidence suggests that the Jewish policies of Putin’s
government are primarily motivated by his personal attitudes toward Jews, based on his
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biography, which includes several notably influential and positive Jewish friends, mentors, and
role models. A fuller explanation of Russian Jewish policies will depend on theories of political
organization and influence within the Putin government, which can account for degrees of
autonomy granted to high-ranking officials in the ministries, the administration, the Duma, and
state-controlled corporations.
Possible future changes in Jewish policy in Russia may help elucidate which theory best
explains the Kremlin. A change in Jewish policy – which may already be underway, quietly,
unofficially – may shed light on how policies are made, implemented, and changed in the Putin
government. They may also support or refute theories about the ideological or pragmatic nature
of the Kremlin regime.
Beyond the implications for understanding Russia and similar regimes, evaluating these
theories may also shed light on the nature of anti-Semitism itself. Explaining the Putin
government’s Jewish policies can provide a case study for the relationship between antiSemitism and politics in other countries. Hopefully, the 21st-century Russia will prove to be a
significant example of anti-Semitism being eradicated in the very place in which it recently
thrived.
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